In this paper, we describe the multiagent supply chain simulation framework MACSIMA. This framework allows the design of large-scale supply network topologies consisting of a multitude of autonomous agents representing the companies in the supply network and acting on their behalf. MACSIMA provides all agents with negotiation and learning capabilities so that the co-evolution and adaptation of the price negotiation strategies of the business agents that exchange goods over an electronic business-to-business (B2B) market can be simulated and evaluated. An electronic B2B market is a market run by computers (and often mounted on a website) providing facilities for companies acting as suppliers to post offered materials, products, services together with price ideas on the market and matching these offers with the demand of other companies acting as producers or retailers. Thereby MACSIMA supports a fine-tuning of the parameterization of the learning mechanism of each individual business agent and additionally enables the agents to exchange information about finished negotiations with other cooperating agents. We outline evaluation results with a first focus on the emergence of niche strategies within a group of cooperating agents. After that we center a second focus on the coordination efficiency, i.e. on the effects of the application of different learning mechanism parameterizations on the overall turnover and profit of supply networks. Our simulation results show that depending on the parameter setting of the learning mechanism the outcome (e.g. the overall turnover) of such a supply network can vary significantly.
INTRODUCTION
A supply chain is a chain of possibly autonomous business entities that collectively procure, manufacture and distribute certain products. Since today's markets are highly dynamic, supply chain partner companies are forced to form supply chains on the basis of more flexible and co-operative partnerships. For these reasons, so-called supply webs (Laseter 1998) (Porter 2000) -i.e. dynamic networks of supply chain units enabled by B2B markets -will replace today's static supply chains to an increasing extent. In such B2B-enabled dynamic supply networks, the selection of partner companies producing and supplying needed resources and semi-finished goods is not fixed in advance but is carried out over electronic markets through instantiated coordination mechanisms, e.g. specialized auction or negotiation mechanisms, according to the current state of demand. This means that due to their dependence on the changing environment, the members as well as the topology of the supply network are constantly evolving. But taking part in such specialized B2B coordination mechanisms increases transaction cost and can get too complex for humans to handle efficiently. In order to cope with this dilemma it is suggested by numerous researchers to encapsulate operative supply chain units within agents (Chaib-draa and Müller 2006) that are able to adapt themselves to varying circumstances and partner companies quickly and efficiently. Agents offer the advantage of being able to automatically form and manage such changing partnerships since they can autonomously perform tasks on behalf of their users and in doing so reduce transaction cost. But so far there exist almost no consolidated findings about what coordination efficiency results if negotiations about the exchange of goods in a large-scale B2B scenario are totally transferred to business agents that are purely self-interested and thus do not strive for mutually beneficial transactions but try to outperform their partners by elaborated negotiation strategies. To examine the resulting dynamics within a supply network built up by adaptively negotiating agents, we have instantiated MACSIMA (Multi Agent Supply Chain SIMulAtion Framework).
THE MACSIMA FRAMEWORK
The MACSIMA framework has been implemented in Java and offers a set of generic supply chain agent types for instantiating supply network scenarios with the ability to take part in bilateral negotiations, as well as with elaborated learning capabilities, enabling them to learn Proceedings 23rd European Conference on Modelling and Simulation ©ECMS Javier Otamendi, Andrzej Bargiela, José Luis Montes, Luis Miguel Doncel Pedrera (Editors) ISBN: 978-0-9553018-8-9 / ISBN: 978-0-9553018-9-6 (CD) from negotiation successes and failures in order to adapt their negotiation strategy iteratively.
Generic Agent Types
The generic supply chain agent types provided by MACSIMA are 1. resource or supplier agents (R i ) supply raw materials to the network. 2. producer agents (Pi) stand in the middle of the value chain and buy raw materials or semi-finished goods from resource agents or other producer agents as input goods to their production function and offer their output goods for purchase. 3. consumer agents (Ci) stand at the end of the added value network and buy products from the producers. They cannot run out of money, but however, have a consumption function that specifies their maximal willingness to pay. 4. good agents (Gi) keep an account of the number of successful (transactions) or unsuccessful (rejections) price negotiations concerning a specific good together with the negotiated prices etc. These agents are not necessary for conducting simulation runs but simplify the statistical evaluation of simulation results. In MACSIMA, simulation scenarios can be defined and parameterized in a very detailed way as well as with a high degree of freedom, so that the user is totally free to decide on the number of tiers and interacting agents.
Simulation Scenarios and Building Blocks
In our simulation runs conducted so far we have concentrated on different instantiations of a five-tiersupply-network for computer manufacturing (see fig. 1 ). fig. 2) . Therefore, MACSIMA offers a graphical user interface that not only simplifies the definition of topologies but also enables one to parameterize the learning capabilities of each agent that is instantiated for a simulation run in detail as described later. figure 3 . If an agent is instantiated as a supplier or consumer agent, the control cycle is shortened by turning some functions, e.g. Start Buy-Negotiation, off. We usually run scenarios with 25 to 100 agents on an Intel Quadcore-architecture with 3 GB RAM and 32bit Windows Vista as operating system.
Negotiation Protocol
In the bilateral negotiation process, all agents are provided with the same action alternatives derived from Pruitt's strategic choice model (Pruitt 1981) .
Negotiation Acts
This model states that humans show specific behavior in economic negotiation scenarios and select in every negotiation round from among five basic strategies, namely 1. unilateral concession: decreasing the distance between conflicting positions, 2. competitive behavior: remaining with one's position and trying to argue the other party out of its position, 3. coordinative behavior, 4. idleness: not continuing the negotiation, or 5. demolition: withdrawing unilaterally. (Eymann 2000) states that these basic building blocks can be reduced to three negotiation action alternatives: 1. Accept: the price proposal of the other agent is accepted and the transaction is conducted. The buyer pays the end price to the seller and receives the product. 2. Propose: the agent at turn does not agree to the price proposal of its opponent and makes a new proposal on its part. This new proposal can be equal to its last proposal (no concession in this round of negotiation) or be newly calculated. 3. Reject: an agent breaks off the negotiation. Both agents thus have to search for other negotiation partners. On the basis of these three negotiation acts the agents in MACSIMA use the following negotiation protocol that is sufficient for modeling bilateral price negotiations between agents in the examined supply network application domain. 
Strategy Parameters
For modeling complex strategic negotiation behaviour on the basis of the described action alternatives we use six strategy parameters that determine the negotiation strategy of an agent. These can take on values from the interval [0;1] and are stored in a so-called genotype, a data structure suitable for processing by a genetic algorithm:
acquisitiveness (A) 2. delta_change (DC) 3. delta_jump (DJ) 4. satisfaction (S) 5. weight_memory (WM) 6. reputation (R)
An agent possesses several genotypes -i.e. vectors of the form <A|DC|DJ|S|WM|R)> containing these parameters -that are stored in its pool of genotypes (see figure 5 , right upper corner) and are evolutionary adapted to varying negotiation partners and market conditions as described in figure 5 and the section "Negotiation Module". Each parameter of a genotype influences non-deterministically an agent's individual negotiation behaviour. The acquisitiveness of an agent defines the probability that it will offer a unilateral concession on its next "move", i.e. as the seller lowering its asking price. This parameter taking on a value of 1 would prohibit an agent from making any price concession. The delta_change parameter defines the step size of a monetary concession by specifying a percent value by which the price distance between one's last price proposal and the counter offer of an opponent is reduced. An agent calculates its individual step size for a concession at the beginning of a negotiation by using current.stepSize = (asked_price -offered_price) * del_change . This keeps the negotiation mechanism symmetric since neither sellers nor buyers are handled in a preferred manner (for attributes of a coordination mechanism see (Fischer et al.1998) ). The delta_jump parameter defines the margin an agent wants to realize. The higher its value, the higher the aimed margin between the buying costs for input goods and the demanded selling price will be. delta_jump modifies the first price proposal of agent A by:
proposal = agreement * (1.0 + del_jump) where agreement equals the price of the last deal for the good. The parameter satisfaction defines the probability that an agent aborts the negotiation. The abort probability after the n th negotiation round is (1 -p_satisfaction) n . To avoid individually nonsensical behaviour the agents have a learning function to detect unreasonable price proposals during a negotiation. Therefore an agent stores the end prices of successful negotiations from its negotiation history in a data structure memory and calculates an internally "sensed" market price (SMP) for each good of interest. The information stored in memory is used to compute its smp with exponential smoothing. Thereby, the parameter weight_memory specifes how fast market changes have influence on the market price.
// update our memory of initial prices memory = offeredPrice * weight_memory + memory * (1-weight_memory); On this basis, at negotiation start each agent checks the first price proposal of its opponent against its SMP. All counter-proposals lying between the SMP and its doubled value are estimated as uncertain and a possible negotiation abort is tested according to p_satisfaction: if (offeredPrice >= memory) { // ...then random reject check If (randomNumberIsHigherThan(p_satisfaction)) { reject = true; } // reject all offers more than double memory if (memory != 0 && offeredPrice > 2 * memory) { reject = true;} All counter-proposals exceeding the doubled SMP are directly rejected to avoid extortion offers. The last parameter reputation, defines the probability of finishing a deal correctly according to the reputation of a partner. The values of these six parameters describe completely the negotiation behaviour and are adapted by the agents' negotiation module during a sequence of negotiations.
Negotiation Module
Each negotiation module of an agent possesses a genetic pool of genotypes. This pool contains several genotypes that are employed in negotiations. After a negotiation has been finished a fitness value is calculated for the genotype in depending on the negotiation outcome. Then the genotype is stored in combination with the ascertained fitness value as plumage in a data structure called population. The sizes of pool and population can be flexibly set for the negotiation module of each agent. After the start of a bilateral negotiation, the first step of an agent is to choose a genotype -determining its strategy for this negotiation -out of its pool of genotypes. Then, both agents negotiate until one of them aborts the negotiations or their price proposals cross and they make a mutually beneficial deal. After a successful negotiation both agents calculate a fitness value for the used genotype and store the resulting combination of genotype and estimated fitness as a so-called plumage into the population data structure. If their information exchange mode is set to external or mixed, they will afterwards send the resulting plumage to other agents, receive plumages from other allied agents and store the self-calculated as well as the received plumages in their population. If the number of stored plumages is larger than the population size the agents will start their learning process by using their individually parameterized evolutionary learning mechanism as sketched in figure 5. 
Parameterization of the Learn Process
When the learning process is started all plumages within the population are assigned to a selection method, which selects the plumages with the best fitness values and assigns as many plumages to a recombination process as the pool size allows. In this recombination process selected genotypes are recombined to new genotypes. Optionally, the newly built genotypes can be modified by probabilistic mutation after the recombination. In the last step, the old population of the agent is deleted and the newly generated pool is assigned to the agent according to its specific replacement scheme. After that the agent may start new negotiations. The possible settings for information exchange and the parameterization of the learning process are described in the following.
Information Exchange
An agent learns either only by itself (internal learning mode), i.e. does not use the experiences (in the form of plumages) of other agents. Or an agent has "colleagues" that exchange plumages about successful finished negotiations and use this information in their next evolution step (external learning mode).
Fitness Calculation
After a successfully finished negotiation, i.e. a mutually closed deal, the fitness value for the genotype used in the negotiation is calculated. MACSIMA offers the agents' designer the following fitness calculation methods: that the same genotype has been used in several negotiations and thus is contained in the population more than once this method calculates the average fitness value for each individual genotype before the selection starts. The individual with the best fitness value comes directly into the new population; the worst one is deleted and the remaining genotypes are selected as in the DS method.
Deterministic Average Selection with deletion of the worst individual (DAS):
The new population is filled up in the same way as with the standard deterministic average selection until the number of individuals in the new population equals pool size minus the value of BestIndividualsToSurvive. For the last place a new genotype is generated as the mean value of each gene of the genotypes already in the new population.
Recombination
This crossover of individuals with good fitness values is a kind of macro mutation which creates jumps in the search space and therefore helps to find a better solution.
n-Point-Crossover (nPC):
The two best individuals are taken out and with a crossover probability. These two are recombined and cut at 'n' randomly chosen positions and linked crossover -or they are put back in the population unchanged. The new generated genotypes replace their parents in the population. 2. Random Crossover (RaC): Two individuals are selected and for each gene it is decided randomly if it is taken for the new genotype.
Mutation and Replacement Scheme
Its main target is to keep the diversity in the population. Usual modifications are implemented in MACSIMA as suggested in (Back et al. 1997) .
Simply deleting the old pool bears a risk that all new genotypes are worse than their parents. To protect the best individuals MACSIMA provides the replacement schemes Elitism and Weak Elitism (Back et al. 1997 ).
Differentiation Factors of MACSIMA
An advantage of MACSIMA is the ability to set up nearly all possible supply network layouts and to instantiate them with numerous intelligent agents using a learning mechanism that can be adjusted to great detail.
The experimental results of (Lau et al. 2006) show that such an evolutionary learning approach for adaptive negotiation agents in e-business scenarios can outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism guaranteeing Pareto optimality. This is a progressive step as compared to the limited learning features of precedent approaches for the simulation and analysis of the effects of learning on the outcome of negotiations in such environments. They offer only very limited learning capabilities, e.g. (Eymann 2000) and (Smith and Taylor 1998) , and almost no support in examining the effects on the generation of social welfare quantitatively. One further differentiating factor consists in the fact that MACSIMA agents can use different information exchange modes with respect to the extent of information exchange with other agents. In this way, the experimenter is able to build cooperating groups out of several agents on each tier and to examine the effects of coalition formation between agents. In this way, the evolution of an agent's negotiation strategy is not only guided by its own experience but can also take the experience of other agents into account. Both allows for comparing different learning mechanisms in combination with different information exchange modes under the same external influences and constraints in a supply network. To our knowledge MACSIMA represents so far the only simulation framework suitable for this kind of experimental simulation and outcome analysis.
SIMULATION RESULTS
The agents in MACSIMA log their internal status as well as their activities, negotiation steps and final outcomes in several separated and statistically evaluable data files. This raw data comprises information about the evolution of the agents' individual negotiation strategies, the course of negotiations together with their outcomes etc. This raw data can be easily transformed into diagrams that show the course of the evolution process of the agents' strategy parameters together with the emerging price fluctuations for the traded goods in the time elapsed.
Impacts of Evolutionary Adaptation
In our simulation runs conducted so far we have mainly concentrated on different instantiations of a five-tiersupply-network for computer manufacturing (see fig. 1 ). A first scenario has been defined in which genetic adaption was initially turned off and all agents were provided with the same static strategy parameter set <A=0.5|DC=0.25|DJ=0.15|S=0.75|WM=0.2|R=1> -except for the processor producers whose acquisitiveness parameter A was set to 0.51 instead of 0.5. The price fluctuations in the resulting simulation runconsisting of 300,000 simulation periods -are presented in the figure 6. Already the slight modification of the acquisitiveness leads to a strategic advantage for the processor agents and forces adjacent tiers to significant concessions. Instead of this, some agents of the processor tier benefit individually from following a niche strategy consisting in keeping the value of one's own acquisitiveness parameter slightly lower than the majority of the agents of the same type (see e.g. agents no. 1 and 6). Agents of the same type but of lower acquisitiveness than their colleagues can benefit from this fact and increase their sales since their opponents expect no concession and thus accept quickly, if unexpected concessions are made.
Maximizing Profit and Turnover
We have examined whether there exists a parameterization by which -if applied by all the agents in a network -social welfare maximizing effects (i.e. an increase of the sum of the individual profits of all agents in a scenario) may be expected. Therefore we have defined 50 simulation scenarios including two "baseline" scenarios each with a different parameterization of the learning process. For each scenario 4 simulation runs with 300,000 simulation periods each have been conducted. The means of some statistical variables from the 4 runs are shown in the figures 9 and 10. This is due to the fact that an expert parameterization of the learning process results in less negotiation break-offs since the agents adapt their negotiation behaviour better.
CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK
We have outlined some simulation results with a first focus on the emergence of niche strategies within a group of cooperating agents and a second focus on the effects of the application of different learning parameterizations on the overall profit of a networked supply economy instantiated by intelligent agents. The results demonstrate the suitability of the MACSIMA framework for modeling, simulating and analyzing complex economical scenarios. Our results show that, if one intends to use negotiating agents for coordinating a supply network one has to keep in mind that the parameterization of their learning mechanisms has to be fine-tuned for reaching an efficient and effective coordination outcome. Depending on the parameter setting the overall profit and turnover of a supply network coordinated by negotiating agents varies significantly. Further work will be directed towards a detailed analysis of the micro-and macro-effects (e.g. society loses welfare whereas certain individuals generate more profit) in dependence on varying learning parameterizations as well as information exchange and coalition formation settings.
